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Abstract:  
 
 This paper examines the macroeconomic welfare effects of interest risk premia and controls that limit 
international capital mobility.  Using extended loanable funds analysis, it first demonstrates how perfect capital 
mobility maximises national income, contrary to a prevalent view that it is inimical to economic welfare.  As a 
corollary, the analysis then shows that capital controls, irrespective of their form, generally reduce national 
income and economic welfare by widening real cross-border interest differentials.  Capital controls in the form 
of quantitative controls, such as the Chilean unremunerated reserve requirement system, and explicit taxes on 
foreign investment flows impose similar welfare losses.  However, quantitative controls are relatively more 
costly than options to tax capital flows, due to revenue effects.   
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 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the demise of the Bretton Woods system of exchange rate management and consequent 
dismantling of a broad range of exchange controls, there has been an enormous growth in the 
volume of international capital flows.  Advanced economies progressively abolished 
exchange controls from the early 1970’s onwards, whereas capital account liberalisation in 
emerging economies accelerated most rapidly from the early 1990’s, according to an index of 
capital controls devised by the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 1997, p.242).   
 
Meanwhile, liberalised capital accounts have increased emerging economies’ vulnerability to 
sudden international capital flow reversals of the magnitude witnessed in East Asia and other 
emerging economies in the late 1990’s.  In view of the economic and financial distress that 
short term capital flow reversals may cause, many economists, such as Bhagwati (1998), 
Cooper (1998), Eichengreen (1999), Krugman (1998), Rodrik (1998) and Wade (1998), favor 
the retention of capital controls for emerging economies. 
 
Discussion of capital mobility in the literature1 has focussed heavily on assessing conditions 
for it, and on its implications for the effectiveness of short run macroeconomic policy 
management.2  Capital mobility has been measured against the standard interest parity 
conditions, as well as the extent of correlation between domestic saving and investment 
(proposed by Feldstein and Horioka (1980)).  While considerable attention has been given to 
examining how capital mobility affects the potency of monetary and fiscal policy as 
stabilisation tools, relatively little attention has been paid to examining how capital mobility  
                                                          
1   See surveys by Dumas (1995), Lewis (1995), Marston (1995) and Isard (1995).  
2   See Mundell (1962) and Fleming (1962) and later surveys of their model by Bruce and Purvis (1985) and 
Frenkel and Razin (1995), amongst others. 
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directly affects national income as a measure of macroeconomic welfare.  
 
This paper first demonstrates how international borrowing improves national income and 
macroeconomic welfare.  As a corollary, it then identifies the welfare losses, or implicit costs, 
that arise when international capital mobility is less than perfect, due to official capital 
controls of various kinds.  In preview, these losses occur because capital immobility raises 
the external cost of capital, making national income sub- optimal.  However, the size of the 
welfare loss depends on the kind of capital controls in place.   
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2.   AN EXTENDED LOANABLE FUNDS FRAMEWORK 
 
International capital flows are not purely financial phenomena since international borrowing 
and lending is ultimately tied to economic factors that determine saving and investment 
behaviour.  Intertemporal open economy models recognise this, yet their focus is external 
account determination with reference to the behaviour of saving, investment and 
intertemporal consumption under conditions of perfect capital mobility.3   
 
In what follows, capital mobility is related to saving, investment and the international flow of 
funds, consistent with the intertemporal approach.  However, unlike intertemporal models, 
the analysis is limited to within-period effects to identify the welfare costs of capital controls.    
 
2.1 Capital Autarky versus Perfect Capital Mobility 
 
First, we assume autarky and that domestic saving, S, the residual from national income after 
private and public consumption plans have been satisfied, is fixed and interest inelastic.   
Total investment spending over a given period is funded out of available saving, with the real 
interest rate performing the balancing role.  Demand for loanable funds is a function of the 
real interest rate: 
I = I (i) (1) 
where i is the real interest rate and I′ (i) < 0.  In equilibrium under autarky, the domestic 
interest rate iA is such that the market for loanable funds clears and 
I(iA) = SA (2) 
                                                          
3  See for instance Frenkel and Razin (1987) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996).  
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Consequently, the domestic saving schedule is drawn vertically, whereas the net domestic 
demand for investment purposes is a derived demand, depicted as a downward sloping 
schedule in interest rate-loanable funds space in Figure 1. 
 
With perfect capital mobility, a small economy’s domestic borrowing requirement over and 
above available domestic saving is fully met by foreign lenders (investors) at the exogenous 
real world interest rate, i*.  Therefore, let SF be the foreign lending schedule, where SF  =  SF 
(i).  Moreover, S′F (i) = ∞, as the foreign lending schedule is infinitely elastic.  Since 
domestic firms will only be willing to borrow from abroad if iA  >  i*,  assume this condition 
also holds.  The market for loanable funds must clear, so with perfect capital mobility 
FA
* SS)i(I +=  (3) 
where from the home economy perspective, SF is foreign capital inflow in the form of 
borrowing.4 
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Figure 1 – International Capital Mobility and Macroecono
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Domestic investment therefore exceeds domestic saving at i* to the extent of foreign 
borrowing.  This ex ante foreign borrowing requirement is shown by distance fc in the figure.  
Hence, if external debt is initially nil, it reaches level fc by period end.  As the real world 
interest rate is lower than the real autarky interest rate, and since I′ (i) < 0, we must have I(i*) 
> I(iA), so that investment under autarky is always lower than when international borrowing is 
permitted.   
 
Here, and in what follows, we abstract from the effect that changing exchange rate 
expectations have on interest differentials by assuming that foreign lending is denominated in 
the currency of the lenders, thereby nullifying exchange rate risk from foreigners’ 
perspective.  This is consistent with the practice of advanced economy lending to emerging 
economies, the bulk of whose loans are denominated in foreign currency terms.  
Alternatively, it is possible to assume that exchange rate expectations are static throughout.  
International capital mobility is therefore perfect in this context if foreign lenders satisfy the 
excess domestic demand for funds and real interest parity prevails.   
 
2.2 Income Gains from Foreign Borrowing 
 
Figure 1 also reveals how foreign borrowing raises national income, consistent with 
McDougall’s (1960) neoclassical foreign investment model.  The marginal product of capital 
determines the slope of the investment demand schedule, so that given i , extra units of 
foreign financed capital, times their marginal product, add to GDP to the extent of the area 
abcd.  However, of that the rectangular area, afcd is paid to foreign lenders, leaving a net 
national income gain equivalent to the triangular area fbc.   International capital mobility 
*
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therefore enables lower domestic interest rates and higher national income, provided the 
productivity of the extra foreign-financed capital exceeds its cost. 
 
More formally, the welfare gain under perfect capital mobility is: 
∫ ∫ −−=−= A Aii ii AAAP iiSdiiIdiSiIW * * ].[)(])([ *  (4) 
 
Note that, since I(i) > SA for all interest rates between iA and i*, we must have WP > 0, so that 
the welfare gain from international borrowing is always positive.  Interest paid to foreign 
investors is equal to i*[I* - SA]. 
 
2.3 The Costs of Capital Immobility  
 
If foreign lenders perceive high foreign debt as a sign of heightened country risk and 
diminished creditworthiness, they demand an interest premium, ρ, to compensate.  This 
explains the convex foreign lending schedule rising from the world interest rate, i* in 
Figure 1.  The more averse foreign investors are to rising foreign debt, the steeper the slope 
of the S  schedule and the higher the risk premium and interest differential will be.  At some 
point, foreigners could judge the level of lending risk prohibitive, such that the foreign 
lending schedule becomes vertical.     
F
 
Hence, the foreign lending schedule is no longer perfectly elastic.  Reflecting the assumption 
that the risk premium is an increasing function of the stock of borrowing outstanding, it 
obeys, SF  = SF (i) with S′F(i) > 0,.5   The risk premium, always positive, is the difference 
                                                          
5 Of course, if the initial level of debt exceeded zero, the foreign lending schedule would rise from a point above 
i*. 
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between the interest rate foreign lenders demand under imperfect capital mobility and the 
interest rate i* under perfect capital mobility.  Hence,  
ρ+= *iid  (5) 
where i is the equilibrium domestic interest rate. d
Now the market for loanable funds must still clear, so in equilibrium, 
I ( i ) = S( ) (6) d di
or, using the above expression for , di
I(i* + ρ) = S (i* + ρ) (7) 
Since ρ > 0, and since the demand for loanable funds is decreasing in the interest rate,  
I(i* +ρ) < I(i*) (8) 
Hence, under imperfect capital mobility, investment is lower than with perfect capital 
mobility. 
 
Foreign debt related risk therefore causes macroeconomic welfare losses since potential 
national income gains from foreign borrowing are not realised.  With reference to Figure 1, 
the welfare loss is area fgec.  Note however that foreign borrowing still confers a net welfare 
gain of gbe, provided the equilibrium interest rate allowing for risk is less than the autarky 
rate.  Although international capital immobility limits an economy's growth, it also follows 
that the higher the interest risk premium, the slower foreign debt accumulates, suggesting that 
rising interest risk premia stabilise foreign debt levels. 
 
More formally, the welfare gain from foreign borrowing under imperfect capital mobility,  
IW  , is 
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WI = [I(i) - S∫ +∗Aii ρ A ] di (9) 
 
The costs, or welfare losses, of imperfect capital mobility can now be quantified simply as, 
L = [I(i) - S∫ +∗ ρ*ii F (i)] di (10) 
 
This loss is always positive, since I (i) > SF (i) for all interest rates in between i* and i* + ρ. 
 11
 
3.   CAPITAL CONTROLS 
 
In the above benchmark cases, foreign investors lent funds through their purchases of debt 
instruments, without official restrictions of any kind imposed by the borrower economies.  
We now examine the macroeconomic welfare costs of imposing such restrictions.  In 
practice, such controls range from those aimed at limiting the quantum of capital inflows to 
those in the form of taxes on capital inflows.  What becomes evident is that irrespective of the 
type of capital control, the minimum lending rate demanded by foreign lenders, or 
alternatively the minimum yield expected on bonds issued by the borrowing economy, will 
always be higher than the prevailing world interest rate, with adverse implications for 
national income.    
 
3.1   Quantitative Restrictions   
 
First we consider the welfare costs of via measures that restrict the quantum of capital 
inflows.  The most common means by which the domestic monetary authorities may limit 
capital inflows is through mandatory unremunerated reserve requirements (URR).  In the 
past, URR’s have been most notably implemented by Chile, but also by monetary authorities 
in Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic and Mexico.  A URR requires 
that a set percentage of funds borrowed from abroad be deposited with the central bank for a 
minimum period.  As no interest is paid on the deposit, this effectively makes the reserve 
requirement an implicit tax on capital inflows.6 
 
                                                          
6 Under the Chilean system, foreign investors also had the option of paying the central bank an amount equal to 
the forgone interest without actually depositing funds, making the tax on capital flows explicit.  See Neely 
(1999), De Gregorio et al (1999) and Ulan (2000)for related discussion. 
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Reserve requirements therefore act to raise the minimum interest rate at which foreign 
investors would lend to finance additional domestic investment.  International lenders are 
faced with the choice of (i) lending F* units for n periods to the economy with the URR at a 
rate of i or (ii) buying bonds offering a yield of i*.  With option (i), if V is the future value 
of F
0q
* at period n, then V and F* must be related according to the relationship, 
n
qi
VF
)1(
0
*
+=  (11) 
Total capital inflow to the economy imposing the reserve requirement will be F*(1+s), where 
s represents the fraction of the inflow required to be deposited with the central bank for m 
periods, assuming m≤n.7 At the end of period m, the unremunerated reserve deposit sF* is 
refunded by the central bank and is lent at the rate i*.   At period n, both option (i) and (ii) 
investments mature. 
 
To determine the relationship between i and the exogenous world interest rate i*, the 
present values of the two investments are equated, yielding: 
0q
n
q
m i
V
i
sFFs
)1()1(
)1(
0
*
*
*
+++=+  (12) 
By substituting in the relationship between V and F*, then rearranging, the following 
relationship between and i* is obtained. 
0q
i
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( ) *1*1
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1
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i
isii
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q >−


+
−+++=  (13) 
The above expression suggests that the initial minimum lending rate  must rise as s and m 
rise or as n falls.  However, for the purposes of estimating welfare effects, we assume that 
0q
i
                                                          
7 As a special case, under the Colombian regime, the reserve requirement depended inversely on the maturity of 
the foreign loan. 
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m=n=1.  Again, if investors continue to be averse to rising external indebtedness, the 
equilibrium interest rate will be , inclusive of a risk premium, and the macroeconomic 
welfare effects will be as shown in Figure 2 below.  The welfare loss from capital immobility 
is area fhjc, whereas the net gain compared with the autarky state is area hbj. 
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diSiIWW q
i
i AqI
])([1
*∫ −=−  (16) 
 
3.2   Taxes on Foreign Lending 
 
Alternatively, capital controls may be in the form of explicit proportional taxes on principal 
loaned or interest earned by foreign lenders (sometimes called withholding taxes).  Assume 
foreigners have F* to invest and can choose between (i) holding foreign currency 
denominated debt instruments issued by the borrower economy that mature at the end of 
period n, paying a pre-tax rate of return of it0 or (ii) holding bonds at the alternative world 
interest rate of i*.   
 
If the proportional rate of tax on foreign lending is t, then arbitrage should ensure that, 
)t1()i1(F)i1(F n0t
*n** −+=+  (17) 
which yields the following expression8 for it0 . 
*
n
1
n
1
n
1
*
0t i
)t1(
)t1(1
)t1(
ii >
−
−−+
−
=  (18) 
 
This expression shows that with a discriminatory tax on foreign lending, the minimum return 
it0 demanded by foreign investors to fund domestic investment has to be higher than i*, the 
higher is t, or the lower is n.  Again, for the purpose of gauging the within period 
macroeconomic welfare effects, however, we simply assume n = 1, in which case the above 
expression reduces to  
                                                          
8 More complicated formulations are possible, such as including regular repayments on the loan, but these do 
not provide a closed form solution to the interest rate relationship. 
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t1
tii
*
0t −
+=      (19) 
or,   
tii *0t +≈  (20) 
provided the discriminatory tax rate is not excessively high. 
 
Moreover, if foreign investors remain averse to the economy’s rising external indebtedness as 
discussed earlier, the equilibrium domestic interest rate will be it1 as shown in Figure 3.   The 
loss specifically due to the tax on capital outflows is the foregone national income hjcf less 
the taxation revenue gain for the economy, approximated by hjmk. 
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Figure 3 – Welfare Effects of Taxes on Capital I
 
 
More formally, the economy experiences a net economic welfare g
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Because , this welfare gain is lower than that accruing with imperfect capital 
mobility and no discriminatory taxes, and less again than perfect capital mobility would 
bestow.   
*
1 iii dt >>
 
The macroeconomic welfare loss specifically due to the tax on capital inflow is, 
[ Adtiti AtI SiIiidiSiIWW d −−+−=− ∫ )()(])([ 11 ] (22) 
Other things equal, this loss is less than would arise under a URR capital control regime. 
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4.  CONCLUSION  
 
High capital mobility improves macroeconomic welfare in advanced and emerging 
economies because it narrows real interest differentials and raises domestic investment.  In 
this way, international financial flows play an important role in the process of economic 
growth by enabling domestic capital accumulation to be higher than otherwise.  An 
important, though hitherto neglected corollary is that capital immobility stemming from 
capital controls directly causes macroeconomic welfare losses.   
 
Using an extended loanable funds framework, this paper has shown that exchange controls of 
different kinds reduce macroeconomic welfare by raising the external cost of capital.  Capital 
controls in the form of taxes on inflows are preferable to quantitative controls known as 
unremunerated reserve requirements, since taxes impose smaller welfare losses due to 
revenue effects.  This result mimics the well-known result from international trade theory that 
it is better to impose tariffs, rather than quotas, on imported goods and services. 
 
 At the same time, this paper has abstracted from problems that may arise in practice with the 
intermediation of funds through financial institutions, as well as information asymmetries 
between domestic borrowers and international lenders and moral hazard problems arising 
from official guarantees to lenders, explicit and implicit.  It has also implicitly been assumed 
that capital controls are not evaded, though empirical evidence provided by Dooley (1996) 
and Edwards (1998) suggests that in practice evasion has been widespread.   
 
Capital controls are advocated as a means of minimising international capital flow reversals 
that occur due to information and moral hazard problems.  However, the above analysis 
 18
suggests these problems are best addressed at their primary source, the domestic economy’s 
financial system, not by means of capital controls as a second best policy option. 
 19
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